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462 DOUGLAS AmCRAFT Co. 1'. CRAXSTON [58 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 26426. In Bank. Oct. 2, 1962.] 
DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff and 
Respondent, v. ALAN CRANSTON, as State Controller, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Eschea.t-Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act-
Objectives.-The objectives of the Uniform Disposition of Un-
claimed Property Act (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1500-1527) are to 
protect unknown owners by locating them and restoring their 
property to them and to give the state rather than the holders 
of unclaimed property the benefit of the use of it. 
[2] Limitation of Actions-Limitation Laws-Extension of Time. 
-An extension of the statutory period within which an action 
must be brought is generally valid if made before the causp. 
of action is barred; the party claiming to be adversely affected 
is deemed to suffer no injury where he WU3 under an obligation 
to pay before the period was lengthened, the theory being that 
the legislation affects cnly the remedy and not a right. 
[3] Id.-Limitation Law&-Extension of Time.-A statute that en-
larges a period of limitation applies to matters pending but 
not already barred unless the statute expressly provides to the 
contrary. 
[4] Escheat-Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act-
Limitation of Actions.-Since Code Civ. Proc., § 1515, relating 
to the disposition of unclaimed property and providing that 
"The expiration of any period of time specified by statute or 
court order, during which an action or procepding may be 
commenced or enforced to obtain payment of a claim for 
money or recovery of property, shall not prevent the money or 
property from being presumed abandoned property, nor affect 
any duty to file a report •.. or to payor deliver abandoned 
property to the State Controller," does not expressly provide 
that it shall be retroactive or apply to claims that were already 
barred when it was enacted, it must be interpreted as applying 
only to claims on which the statute of limitations had not run 
on the effective date of the act. 
[5] Id.-Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act-Limita-
tion of Actions.-Code Civ. Proc., § 1510, subd. (g), relating 
to disposition of unclaimed property and stating what items 
of property must be included in the initial report filed with the 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Limitation of Actions, §§ 5, 6; Am.Jur., Limi-
tation of Actions (1st ed § 29). 
McX:. Dig. References: [1,4, 5] Escheat, § 8; [2, 3] Limitation 
of Actions, § 6. 
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Controller, is expressly nlade retroactive and makes it clear 
that existing llbandoned property is subject to the act, but it 
is not directed to thestatntc of limitations dealt with ill 
§ 1515, which section contains no provision retrollctively re· 
movin$!' the bar of the statute if· it had run before the effecth'e 
date of the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Jesse J. Frampton, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for declaratory rclief with respect to unpaid wage 
claims on which the statute of limitations had run, but which 
the State Controller claimed should be reported and paid to 
him under thc Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property 
Act. Judgment for plaintiff affirmcd. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, John F. Hassler and 
Bonnie Lee Martin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
Louis Lieber, Jr., Elmer J. Stone and William D. Craig 
for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In 1959 the Legislature enacted the Uni-
form Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act. (Code Civ. 
Proc., §§ 1500-1527.) The act defines abandoned property 
(§ § 1502-1508) and requires that its holder shall report 
(§ 1510) and payor deliver it to the State Controller (§ 1512). 
The statute of limitations is not a defense to such reporting 
and payment or delivery (§ 1515), and the act applies to 
property that was abandoned before it took effect (§ 1510, 
subd. (g». It provides for notice to the owner by publication 
and otherwise (§§ 1510, subd. (e), 1511). The owner may 
appear at any time and daim the property from the Controller 
after it has been delivered to him (§§ 1517-1520). Delivery 
to the Controller is a defense to any action by the owner 
against the holder. (§ 1513.) [1] The objectives of the 
act are to protect unknown owners by locating them and restor-
ing their property to them and to give the state rather than 
the holders of unclaimed property the benefit of the use of 
it, most of which experience shows will never be claimed. 
After the act became effective, Douglas Aircraft Company 
brought this action agaillst the Controller for declaratory 
relief with respect to over $17,000 in ullpaid wage claims for 
work done in California 011 which the statute of limitations had 
) 
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run before the effective date of the act. Douglas pcrforllis 
government and private contracts. In the past it has crcditcd 
unclaimed wages arising out of its contracts with the United 
States to the United States, and the Coutroller makes no claim 
that such wages should be reported or paid to him. Hc con-
tends, however, that Douglas is required to report and pay 
unclaimed wages arising out of work done on nongovernment 
contracts to the extent that such wages are ascertainable from 
the available records of Douglas (§ 1510, subd. (g» whethcr 
or 110t the statute of limitatious had run on the claims for such 
wages before the effective date of the act. The trial court held 
that Douglas could 110t constitutionally be required to pay 
wage claims to the Controller on which thc statute of limita-
tions had run before the effective date of the act. The Con-
troller appeals. 
Douglas contends that the California Constitution precludes 
the Legislature from abrogating the defense of the statute of 
limitations after the statute has run. (See Chambers v. Galla-
gher, 177 Cal. 704, 708"709 [171 P. 931] ; Chambers v. Gibson, 
178 Cal. 416, 417 [173 P. 752].) It further contends that even 
if the generally applicable California rule were otherwise, 
the due process clauses of the United States and California 
Constitutions would preclude requiring it to report and pay 
wage claims on whieh the limitations had run under the 
circumstances of this case. In this respect it asserts that owing 
to its reliance on the statute of limitations, it has not kept 
records that would enable it, except at unreasonable expense, 
to invoke the act's protection against double liability (§ 1513) 
and contends that to expose it to such liability would deny 
due process of law. (See Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 
U.S. 428, 442-443 [71 S.Ct. 822, 95 L.Ed. 1078]; Western 
Union Tel. 00. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 [82 S.Ct. 199, 
201,7 L.Ed.2d 139].) 
The Controller contends that the rule of Chambers v. 
Gallagher, 177 Cal. 704 [171 P. 931], that the defense of the 
statute of Jimitations cannot be abrogated after the statute 
has run should be limited to cases in which a prescriptive 
title has been acquired or the liability was created by statute. 
(See William Danzer Co. v. Gulf &- S. I. R.R. Co., 268 U.S. 633, 
637 [45 S.Ct. 612, 69 L.Ed. 1126].) With respect to contract 
claims he urges that we adopt the rule of the United States 
Supreme Court that the due process clause docs not prohibit 
abrogating the defense of the statute of limitations after the 
statute has run. (See Oampbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 628 
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also contends that the act adequately protects Douglas from 
the risk of double liability and that there are no special 
circumstances in this case that would make the abrogation of 
the defense of the statute of limitations a denial of due 
process to Douglas. 
We need not resolve these conflicting constitutional conten· 
tions unless it clearly appears that the act provides for thl! 
retroactive abrogation of the defense of the statute of limita-
tions. Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides tllat 
"No part of it is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." 
(See also Di Genova v. State Board of Education, 57 Ca1.2d 
167, 172-173 [18 Cal.Rptr. 369, 367 P.2d 865J ; Corning Hos-
pital Dist. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 488, 494 [20 Cal.Rptr. 
621, 370 P.2d 325].) [2] The law governing changes in 
the statute of limitations is summarized in EvelYll, Inc. v. 
California Emp. Stab. Com., 48 Cal.2d 588, 592 [311 P.2d 
500] : "The extension of the statutory period within which an 
action must be brought is generally held to be valid if made be-
fore the cause of action is barred. (lV eldon v. Rogers, 151 Cal. 
432 [90 P. 1062].) The party claiming to be adversely affected 
is deemed to suffer no injury where he ,vas under an obligation 
to pay before the period was lengthened. This is on the theory 
that the legislation affects only the remedy and not a right. 
(Mudd v. McColgan, 30 Cal.2d 463 [183 P.2d 10] ; Davis & 
MdIillan v. Incl1tstr'ial Ace. Com., 198 Cal. 631 [246 P. 1046,46 
A.L.R. 1095] ;31 Cal.Jur.2d 434.) An enlargement of the 
limitation period by the Legislature has been held to be proper 
in cases where the period had not run against a corporation for 
additional franchise taxes (Edison Calif. Stores, Inc. v. Mc-
Colgan, 30 Cal.2d 472 [183 P.2d 16]), against an individual 
for personal income taxes (Mudd v. jlcColgan, supra, 30 Cal. 
2d 463), and against a judgment debtor (Weldon v. Rogers, 
supra, 151 Cal. 432). [ 3 ] It has been held that unless the 
statute expressly provides to the contrary any such enlarge-
ment applies to lI\atters pending but not already barred. 
(Mudd v. McColgan, supra, 30 Cal.2d 463.)" 
These rules afford warning to potential defendants that until 
the statute of limitations has run it may be extended, whereas 
after it has run, they may rely upon it in conducting their 
affairs. The keeping of records, the maintenance of reserves, 
and the commitment of funds may all be affected by surh 
reliance, particularly in a well-organized enterprise that seeks 
I 
I 
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to operate efficiently. To defeat such reliance uoes more than 
ucprive obligors of windfalls; it deprives them of the ability 
to plan intelligently with respect to stale and apparently 
abandoned claims. In view of these considerations, we believe 
that in enacting the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Prop-
erty Aet the Legislature would have expressed itself in un-
mistakable terms bad it rejected the establishcd rules goveru-
ing the interpretation of statutes of limitations. 
[ 4] Section 1515 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides 
that" The expiration of any period of time specified by statute 
or court order, during which an action or proceeding may be 
commenced or enforced to obtain payment of a claim for 
money or recovery of property, shall not pre"ent the money or 
property from being presumed abandoned property, nor affect 
any duty to file a report required by this chapter or to pay 
or deliver abandoned property to the State Controller." This 
section does not expressly provide that it shall be retroactive 
or apply to claims that were already barred when it was 
enacted. Accordingly, under section 3 of thc code and the 
rules set forth in the Evelyn case it must be interpreted as 
applying only to claims on which the statute of limitations 
had not run on the effective date of the act. As to such claims, 
and as to claims that will arise in the future, however, it 
prevents the running of the statute applicable between the 
holder and the owner from barring the duty of the holder 
to report and pay to the Controller. 
There is nothing in subdivisions (e) and (g) of section 1510 
that eompels giving section 1515 a different interpretation. 
Subdivision (e) provides: "If the holder of property pre-
sumed abandoned under this chapter knows the whereabouts 
of the owner and if the owner's claim has not been barred by 
the statute of limitations, the holder shall, before filing the 
annual report, communicate with the o"\vner and take necessary 
steps to prevent abandonment from being presumed. The 
holder shall exercise reasonable diligence to ascertain the 
whereabouts of the owner." This subsection deals with the 
continuing situation in the administration of the act arising 
from the fact that frequently the statute of limitations against 
the owner wiU have run before the property is presumed aban-
doned and required to be reported. In such cases subdivision 
(e) provides that there is nq duty to attempt to locate or 
commuuicate with the owner. It does not provide, however, 
that the bar of the statute is inapplicable against the Controller 
if it had run before the effective date of the act. 
) 
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[5] Subdivisiou (~) of section 1510 provides: "The 
initial report filed under this chapter shall include all items 
of property held for another person which are ascertainable 
from the available records of the holder, which items of prop-
erty would have been presumed abandoned if this chapter 
had been in effect at and after the time such property first 
became payable, demandable or returnable; ... All items of 
property, less proper charges and offsets, other than unclaimed 
funds, which on January 1, 1949 appeared from the available 
records to be held for another person and were thereafter 
without notice to the owner or without prior approval of any 
regulatory or licensing authority of this State transferred or 
credited by the holder directly to capital or surplus or undi-
vided profits shall be deemed to be subject to the provisions 
of this chapter and shall be included within the initial report." 
This section is expressly made retroactive and makes clear 
that existing abandoned property is subject to the act. Such 
property includes major categories as to which the statute of 
limitations had not run on the effective date of the act, such 
as obligations of financial institutions (Code Civ. Proc., § 348) 
and trustees (Davcnport v. Davenport Foundation, 36 Ca1.2d 
67, 75 [222 P.2d 11] ; State v. Standard Oil 00., 5 N.J. 281, 
298-304 [74 A.2d 565]) and other obligations upon which the 
statute does not begin to run until a demand has been made. 
Thus, it is not neeessary to imply a provision removing the 
bar of the statute after it had run to give effect to sub-
division (g). That subdivision defines the property that must 
be included in the initial report to the Controller, but it is 
not directed to the statute of limitations, which is dealt with in 
section 1515. Section 1515 contains no provision retroactively 
removing the bar of the statute if it had run before the 
effective date of the act. We cannot imply such a provision 
in subdivision (g), for the rule against retroactive construc-
tion requires that "a statute should be given the least retro-
active effect that its language reasonably permits." (Oorning 
Hospital Dist. v. Superior Oourt, supra, 57 Ca1.2d 488, 494; 
Interinsurance Exchange v. Ohio Oas. Ins. 00., ante, pp. 142, 
149 [23 Cal.Rptr. 592, 373 P.2d 640].) 
It is true tha~ the draftsmen of the uniform act indicated 
that they believed the provision on which section 1515 is based 
would apply retroactively (9A Uniform Laws Annotated pp. 
267-269) and that similar provisions of other statutes have 
been so interpreted. (Evans Products 00. v. Fry, 307 Mich. 
506 [12 N.W.2d 448, 461] ; In TC Philadelphia Electric 00., 352 
) 
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Pa.457 [43 A.2cl116, 119] ; Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Moore, 297 N.Y. 1 [74 N.E.2cl 24, 27].) The draftsmen, how-
ever, appear to have been preoccupied with the problem of 
whether the statute of limitations applicable between the 
holder and owner could be made inapplicable to the 'duty to 
report and pay to the state even as to claims not barred when 
the act took effect. It is also significant that in adopting the 
uniform act the Legislature omitted the provision that it 
should be construed "to make uniform the law of those states 
which enact it." (Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property 
Act, § 29, 9A Uniform Laws Annotated, p. 274.) Although 
the committee report recommending adoption of the uniform 
act in California referred to the provision making the statute 
of limitations inapplicable against the state, it did not state 
that the provision would apply retroactively to claims that 
were already barred when the statute took effect. (Report of 
the Escheat Subcommittee of the Committee on Judiciary, 
Abandoned Property-State Acquisition and Recovery by 
Rightful Owner, 20 Assembly Interim Committee Reports 
1957-1959, No.4, p. 15.) Accordingly, the California rule 
of construction against retroactivity is applicable here. 
The jUdgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J., 
and Tobriner, J., ~oncurred. 
